The C-5 Galaxy: How Politics Overrode Engineering

When Politics Shapes Airplanes

The Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, one of the largest military transport aircraft ever built, remains a case study in what happens when politics intrudes on engineering. Massive programs like the C-5 rely on political support. Congress. Senators and governors want contracts for their districts—design, testing, or manufacturing—so the funding spreads nationwide. That political reality helps secure votes, but it can also compromise sound engineering decisions.

The C-5 Galaxy Wing Problem

During development, a British aerospace company was given responsibility for designing the C-5’s wing. The result was a structure with a dangerously low fatigue life.

In aircraft design, fatigue life is critical. Aluminum—the primary material for airframes—is lightweight and strong but has one major weakness: it always accumulates fatigue damage. Unlike steel, which can survive infinite stress cycles below a certain threshold, aluminum will eventually crack no matter how low the stress.

This flaw meant the C-5’s wings were destined to wear out too quickly under the repeated stresses of takeoff, landing, maneuvering, and cabin pressurization. The design required a costly, large-scale wing replacement program later in the aircraft’s life.

Lessons from Other Aircraft Failures

The C-5 Galaxy wasn’t the only aircraft to suffer from fatigue issues. The De Havilland Comet, the world’s first commercial jetliner, famously broke apart in mid-air in the 1950s due to cracks forming around rivet holes. More recently, a Boeing 737 suffered catastrophic fuselage failure when part of the roof tore open during flight—again, due to fatigue from countless pressurization cycles.

These examples highlight how unforgiving fatigue can be, and why engineering precision—not political compromise—must drive aircraft design.

Why Engineering Must Lead

In the end, the C-5 Galaxy’s wing problems were preventable. They were known issues, but politics influenced the process, and engineering judgment was not given the final word.

The takeaway is simple: let politicians set policy and funding priorities, but let engineers design the airplanes. When politics overrides engineering, the results are wasted money, delayed programs, and in the worst cases, tragic accidents.

Norman T.  Neher, P.E.
Analytical Engineering Services, Inc.
Elko New Market, MN
www.aesmn.org